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THE SIXTIES: TURMOIL AND TRANS-
FORMATION IN THE NATION, IN
HIGHER EDUCATION, AND AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF MAINE
PETER HOFF
The University of Maine entered its second century of existence in Feb-
ruary 1965, in the midst of a period known as “the sixties,” characterized
by a cultural revolution, a robust civil rights movement, and a long war
in Vietnam. These elements profoundly affected the nation, its people,
and the University of Maine. So did the arrival of a large wave of stu-
dents, the “baby boomers,” plus many for whom higher education had
heretofore been out of reach. Three University of Maine presidents, Lloyd
Elliott, H. Edwin Young, and Winthrop Libby, led the university through
the sixties, addressing significant challenges and changes, which included
student movements aimed at greater freedom in their campus life, par-
ticipation in the civil rights movement, and controversy over the Viet-
nam War. Equally as important for the university as the changes
wrought by these national movements was the effort in Maine to reor-
ganize higher education through the creation of a university system. The
university entered the decade as a stand-alone public land-grant univer-
sity with its own governing board, plus statewide responsibilities in un-
dergraduate and graduate education, basic and applied research, and
extension and outreach to citizens, agriculturalists, and businesses. By
the end of the decade, the University of Maine was still the state’s land-
grant university with comprehensive statewide responsibilities. However,
it had become “The University of Maine at Orono” (UMO), one of sev-
eral units in a new statewide university system, named “The University
of Maine,” and operated out of an office in Portland under the executive
authority of a chancellor and a newly established board of trustees. Alto-
gether, the impact of societal change, a new concept of the role and place
of the student, and a new governance structure made the sixties not only
a transitional decade for the university, but a genuinely transforma-
tional one, bringing new stature and advantages as well as difficult new
circumstances to navigate. Peter S. Hoff, seventeenth president of the
University of Maine (1997-2004) holds a BA from the University of Wis-
consin-Madison, a masters and a PhD in English and Humanities from
Stanford University. In addition to his many articles on British litera-
ture, teaching excellence, and higher education administration, he and
colleague Wendy Leeds-Hurwitz co-authored Learning Matters: The
Transformation of U.S. Higher Education (2013). He lives in Carroll-
ton, Georgia, his native state, where his wife Dianne is Dean of the Col-
lege of Education at the University of West Georgia.
Three University of Maine Presidents at the Helm in a Pivotal Decade
THE UNIVERSITY of Maine entered its second century on Febru-ary 25, 1965, precisely one hundred years after Governor SamuelCony signed legislation establishing the university, one day after
the bill had passed in the legislature in 1865. Before considering the Uni-
versity of Maine’s eventful third fifty years, readers would do well to re-
turn to David Smith’s First Century: A History of the University of Maine
1865-1965, which retells vividly the birth pangs of Maine’s land-grant
college. Without the dogged efforts of Ezekiel Holmes and Phineas T.
Barnes (according to Smith, members of the state’s “agricultural aristoc-
racy”), the legislature might well have settled for a proposal to dispose of
the funds from the land-grant sale by establishing an endowed chair in
agriculture at Bowdoin College and calling it a day. Thanks to leaders
like Holmes and Barnes, the legislature instead took a bolder step and
established the University of Maine.1
February 1965 was a remarkable month, witnessing events that did
much to direct an historic transformation of the American political, so-
cial, cultural, moral, and educational landscape. The country was
halfway through the tumultuous decade known now as “the sixties.” By
the end of the decade, the nation and the university would be far differ-
ent from the beginning.
During February of 1965 Alone:
In popular culture, Ringo Starr, fresh from a tonsillectomy, married
Vivian Cox. John Lennon was making fast progress as a beginner on the
Swiss ski slopes. The band started filming Help in Bermuda after a week-
long recording session at EMI studios that included “Ticket to Ride,” “I
Need You,” and several other hits. The United States’ space program,
which would put a man on the moon in July, 1969, took a major step in
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that direction by launching the lunar probe Ranger 8 from Cape
Canaveral LC-12. The photographs it transmitted helped to select land-
ing sites for future Apollo missions.
More ominously, events took place that would drive the course of
the civil rights movement. On February 1, Martin Luther King, Jr. and
seven hundred demonstrators were arrested in Selma, Alabama. Two
weeks later, police clashed with four hundred black students outside the
Brooklyn Board of Education, as a boycott of New York City schools
continued to grow. On February 18, Reverend C. T. Vivian led a march
to the courthouse in Marion, Alabama, where state troopers rushed the
protesters and attacked them. One of the protestors, Jimmie Lee Jackson,
was shot and killed by an Alabama state trooper. In New York, Malcolm
X was shot and killed by three assailants February 21. On February 25, a
Mississippi federal judge dismissed the “Mississippi Burning” case
against seventeen of the eighteen men accused of murdering three civil
rights workers, claiming insufficient evidence. (The Supreme Court
would within a year reverse this decision). These events, and others, led
to the historic March 7 march on Selma, Alabama.
Equally ominously, February 1965 was the month when the Viet-
nam War explosively escalated. On February 4, National Security Advi-
sor McGeorge Bundy visited South Vietnam for the first time. In North
Vietnam, Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin coincidentally arrived in
Hanoi. Two days later, Viet Cong guerrillas attacked the United States
military compound at Pleiku, killing eight Americans, wounding 126
and destroying ten aircraft. Lyndon Johnson reportedly told his staff,
“I’ve had enough of this,” and on February 7, forty-nine United States
Navy bombers struck Dong Hoi, North Vietnam. Four days later, ninety-
nine navy planes attacked enemy barracks in southern North Vietnam.
Kosygin reacted by promising North Vietnam unlimited military aid, in-
cluding surface-to-air missiles. February 13 saw the Rubicon-crossing
moment when President Lyndon B. Johnson authorized Operation
Rolling Thunder, a campaign of air strikes against North Vietnam be-
ginning in March, 1965 and extending through 1968. On February 16,
United States forces sank a North Vietnamese trawler carrying one hun-
dred tons of Soviet and Chinese-made war material. On February 19,
two South Vietnamese generals launched a coup against General
Nguyen Khanh, which only collapsed when the United States intervened
and helped install a new military/civilian government. On February 22,
General Westmoreland requested two battalions of United States
Marines to protect the American air base at Da Nang from six thousand
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Viet Cong massed in the vicinity. The president approved his request,
despite the “grave reservations” of Ambassador Taylor in Vietnam, who
warned that America may be about to repeat the same mistakes made by
the French. All this occurred in February alone, the University of
Maine’s centennial month.
While February, 1965 was a quiet month on college campuses, the
events chronicled above lit the fuse that soon caused campuses to ex-
plode with intense and violent protest that made them the venue and fo-
cal point for civil rights and anti-war activity for years to come. In
March, the first major teach-in occurred, organized by faculty and Stu-
dents for a Democratic Society, at the University of Michigan at Ann Ar-
bor. Years of often violent campus activism followed.  
In brief, the hundredth anniversary of the University of Maine took
place during a pivotal month in a pivotal decade. Events of the decade
proved both dramatic and transformational. They touched every corner
of American society, and made a profound impact on the nature of
American universities—among them most certainly the University of
Maine.  
The sixties also saw transformation in higher education itself, revo-
lutionizing things like who enrolled, what they studied, how they
learned, what they did when they were not in class, how the universities
themselves operated, how they were funded, and how—even as all the
turmoil was going on—they grew. The University of Maine itself went
from a fall 1960 enrollment of 4,062 to 7,484 in 1970, with another 559
at its new University College in Bangor—doubling its enrollment during
those critical ten years.
In fact, enrollment growth drove events of the 1960s as much those
events drove enrollment. The full force of the post-war baby boom hit
American universities during the sixties, causing both the rapid expan-
sion of enrollments and the creation of new institutions. Many other
factors drove rapid enrollment growth, notably the war and student
draft deferments. In every state, universities filled to the bursting point,
while professors, classrooms, and other facilities were in very short sup-
ply. Public universities’ first reaction was to admit the students, but flunk
out those who could not make the mark immediately. “Look to your left
and look to your right,” deans would sternly warn entering freshmen.
“Two of you won’t be here next semester.”
The National Defense Education Act (a response to the 1957 Russ-
ian Sputnik phenomenon, when Americans began to fear they were los-
ing the space, science, and defense technology races) came to the rescue
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by funding PhD study and turning out professors in droves by 1970. The
national prosperity of the fifties and sixties made a wave of university
building possible. By 1970, the United States had actually created a glut
of professors and universities that has remained ever since, changing the
college recruiting advantage from the admissions office to the prospec-
tive student. Today, all but the most elite universities have to scramble
hard to make their enrollment targets. Competition for students is
fierce. But during the sixties, enrollment growth was rampant almost
everywhere, and most public universities were all but overrun by the
numbers of entering students.
Yet, the economics of student numbers aside, and despite their pre-
carious status on the class rolls, students themselves were the most sig-
nificant drivers of university change during that decade. In 1960, the
concept of in loco parentis was the norm: the institution served as a sur-
rogate parent for the college student. Men and women lived in com-
pletely different residence halls. Female students were required to be in-
side their dorms by curfew—around 10:00 PM weekdays, a bit later on
Fridays and Saturdays. Male students could visit women in their resi-
dence halls, but only in the first-floor main lounges.
Protest movements induced college-aged persons to become more
aware of social issues. Because these issues proved divisive, even among
students of similar backgrounds and ethnicities, they generated more
discussion and often forced students to choose sides and to decide for
themselves whether or not to act in various forms of outward expression
and even protest. Students came to realize that they could actually influ-
ence major policy decisions, from war versus peace to race relations to
fighting poverty to residence hall policies. Thus the petition, the protest,
the sit-in, the boycott, and other tools of protest became common forms
of student action. Students wanted to bring about various forms of
change, from how they were allowed to comport themselves on campus
to how the nation and the world should be run.
This new posture put students more directly and overtly at odds
with adults in authority, especially university administrators. There de-
veloped much more of an “us versus them” relationship between stu-
dents and administrators. Gone was Maine’s beloved old “Prexy Hauck,”
who used to wire students money to get home from Europe or Florida.
His successor, Lloyd Elliott, had made it clear by 1960 that he was “just
not that kind of guy,” even though he placed the good of students at the
top of his priority list and fought in other ways to improve their lot.2
Across the country, protesting students made their feelings known by at-
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tacking the college campus itself even when their true grievance was
elsewhere, such as the “military-industrial complex,” state and federal
governments, the war, and the draft. Students sat-in and took over (and
sometimes even burned) university buildings and administrative offices.
As we shall see, University of Maine presidents faced such challenges and
protests during those years. President Winthrop (“Win”) Libby even had
to deal one night with Stephen King and a few of his fellow protestors,
determined to burn the University of Maine President’s house to the
ground.
Copies of the University of Maine yearbook, Prism, published dur-
ing the sixties gives us a direct window into changing student moods
during that decade. Published each year during the late fifties through
the early seventies, Prism traditionally featured the University of Maine’s
top administrators at or near the front of each volume and commented
on what the administration signified. Nothing could better testify to the
changing mood than these selected passages:
1959:  Sageness . . . scholarship . . . ability to administrate . . . ability to
teach. . . ability. The faculty reflect the ACADEMIC mood. We are
blessed with a superior administration and faculty at Maine. Yearly,
there are personnel changes. In February we lost a great president. We
gained a very capable successor. This is the pattern. Old faces and new
faces—all capable men. At Maine, Deans, Doctors, Professors, and In-
structors alike look at us as not merely students, but men and women.
They are practitioners of the Maine Hello; they are advisors. Better
still, they are friends.
1962: High-flown harbingers, hewing hopes
Wax-winged through the obsidian maze of
Patter-purled confusion, guiding in
Leading, commanding respect in humility.
1964: Intelligence, imagination, and authority are vital qualities of an
administration system which is serving a rapidly expanding university.
. . . Most of the responsibility for this is placed on the administrators
whose vision and advance planning assures us of an education which
will be a valid foundation for a productive life.
1966: The administration and faculty are the carpenters and tools of a
growing university.
By 1968, the pages of Prism began to reveal cracks in that admiration. It
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removed the administration from the beginning of the yearbook and
relegated it to pages 252ff. Although freshman beanies were still evident
in the photos, the rhetoric began to shift:
1968: The Buck sometimes stops here. After leading the University of
Maine through a surge of growth and the birth pangs of the Super-U,
President Young and Vice President Peck leave for greener pastures
next year. Uniting the conflicting views of a varied faculty, and com-
bining them with student aspirations and considering the preferences
of the Board of Trustees is no easy chore. These key men, who though
rarely seen, are strongly felt in this establishment called a university.
The following year, Prism refers to the administration as “The Control.”
1969: those who govern 
and teach 
and this year, 
even shared some 
of their power 
with (some 
of) us; 
they—
learning all the time, 
how to handle. 
this big machine.
The 1969-1970 period was one of great turmoil on campus, with
students protesting the war, civil rights, student rights, the elimination
of in loco parentis, and the earth’s environment, as well as advocating to
the university to retain popular professors denied tenure. The entire
1970 Prism reflected a bitter tone of student dissatisfaction and protest:
All those Botany 500 profs who had stemmed the tide with fancy rhet-
oric found their empire collapsing. All those generations of students
who had talked about steak and potatoes but settled for baby food
were a thing of the past.
“Who actually runs this damned place,” students began to ask, seeking
the truth and getting some tired old vaudeville routines from people
like Dean Nolde and his friends.
In 1967, when the student senate decided to get off its rump and do
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University of Maine President Hugh Young confronting protestors out-
side of the door of the President’s Office. The rhetoric in the student
yearbook Prism began to shift as students began referring to the adminis-
tration as “The Control.”
something, social change was the word. Parietals3 were in. Curfew reg-
ulations were out. Drinking on campus was in. In loco parentis was
quite definitely out. So the hierarchy admitted they would have to
bend a little . . . just a little, but they would still have to bend.
. . . it was very obvious that the university was mired under by its own
bureaucracy, by the inability of administrators and faculty members to
relate to student needs. Very clear. And the understanding that some-
thing had to be done.
Academic freedom. It was never really the issue. Like a test of man-
hood, a tribal ceremony, it served to bring the chancellor and some
trustees face to face with angry students who suddenly saw not men,
but robots, reachable only with wrenches and screwdrivers and not
with reason or emotion. The fight for academics, it was now obvious,
was a losing battle, burying the need to strive for an end to the war.
The next Prism (1971) suggests that 1970, culminating in President
Richard Nixon’s invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State killings, fol-
lowed by more student and civil violence than ever, had worn out the
Maine student body. “The 1970-1971 academic year at the UMO left
many with a feeling of helplessness.”4
These student yearbooks give us a remarkable time-lapse glimpse of
the sea change in student and university culture. Similarly, a look at the
University of Maine’s presidents who spanned this pivotal decade reveals
the challenges they faced, as well as the importance and the conse-
quences of the steps they took to deal with those challenges. Many of
those challenges—enrollment growth, budget pressures, funding, exter-
nal relationships, responding to radically changing times, and student
unrest—were common to the three presidents who immediately fol-
lowed Arthur Hauck. Other items were unique to each presidency.
During the sixties, the university grew rapidly in enrollment and be-
came more complex. It was said that President Hauck had known every
student by name. Given his outgoing personality, and helped by the fact
that his enrollment never topped about three thousand—the size of a
typical high school anywhere but Maine—this claim may well have been
true. The few remaining people who can give an eyewitness account of
the Hauck years all describe his friendliness and benevolence to stu-
dents. He presided over a long period of stability and mild growth, lead-
ing the university through the Great Depression and World War II, and
emerging into a GI-Bill world that expanded higher education access as
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never before. Hauck’s successor, and the university itself, was very differ-
ent.
LLOYD HARTMAN ELLIOTT (UMaine President 1958-1965):5
Well before Arthur Hauck’s last official day as University of Maine
president, February 28, 1958, the process of selecting a successor had
been underway. It was a process astonishingly different from today’s typ-
ical practice of naming a search committee, hiring a search consultant,
advertising the opening widely, soliciting nominations and applications,
conducting rounds of interviews, satisfying all of the affirmative-action
requirements, and bringing the finalists to campus for meetings with all
constituencies.
In the fall of 1957, Arthur Deering, having recently stepped down as
the University of Maine’s Dean of Agriculture, was on sabbatical at Cor-
nell University. Acting on instructions from Board of Trustees Chair
Raymond Fogler, Deering dropped in uninvited and casually to visit
with Cornell’s executive assistant to the president. They struck up a
friendship, and Deering stopped by regularly to chat with the executive
assistant. After some time passed, the Cornell administrator received a
phone call from Fogler, asking if he would be willing to consider the
possibility of becoming the University of Maine’s next president. The ex-
ecutive assistant was Lloyd Elliott, and Elliott said that he asked Fogler
for a day to think about it and consult his family. The next day, Elliott re-
turned the call and turned Fogler down flat. He was happy at Cornell,
his children were in school, and he had no thoughts of changing jobs.
Fogler and Deering politely but firmly refused to take no for an an-
swer. After months of additional friendly persuasion, they convinced El-
liott to at least come to Orono and take a look over two cold and snowy
days. Fogler offered the position to Elliott once again after his visit. This
time he accepted. The New York Times noted the appointment occurred
on February 6, 1958, and Elliott formally took the reins on July 1, 1958.
Elliott reported that he did not officially meet with faculty, students, or
other constituents during his visit and that Fogler handled the negotia-
tions himself. Elliott said there was no significant board of trustees in-
volvement, except that the appointment required their formal vote. In El-
liott’s words, “[Fogler and the board] were willing to speak for all
parties.”6
The Elliott-Deering-Fogler triumvirate soon won many strong
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friends among the faculty, which Elliott always called the “heart and soul
of any university.” Elliott also devoted himself to making the university
better and stronger for its students, though his style differed dramati-
cally from Arthur Hauck’s. According to Elliott, Hauck helped students
who came to his office needing money. Elliott claimed that students had
gotten used to contacting the president’s office when they “ran out of
money in Bermuda,” and Hauck generously wired them funds to get
home. He declared that he was “not that smart” to be able to decipher
which students needed what, either in the form of gifts or “loans.” In-
stead he referred such supplicants to the financial aid office. There is,
however, no indication that he treated students with coldness or with
the back of his hand. He met regularly with elected officers of student
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University of Maine President Lloyd Elliott seated at the head of a conference
table in May of 1965 shortly before his departure for George Washington Uni-
versity. Elliott, despite being hesitant to come to the University of Maine as Pres-
ident, quickly won over the faculty who he always called the “heart and soul” of
the institute.  
groups and kept his finger on the pulse of the student body, whom he
defended staunchly to outside critics, always calling them “hard-work-
ing” and “well behaved.”
These outside critics were a serious barrier to Elliott’s chief agenda,
to increase the state’s financial support of its land-grant university. In his
words, his predecessor had been “too nice” to the legislature, having al-
ways tempered his requests, which resulted, over time, in the university
being seriously underfunded—where it could not admit nearly as many
applicants as were qualified to attend. Hauck, according to Elliott, had
even allowed an adversarial state senator, Bob Haskell (famous as
Maine’s “five-day governor” from January 2-7, 1959), to sit down with
him and go over the books and identify budget reductions. Elliott de-
nied Haskell that opportunity, and fought energetically to improve the
state appropriation to the university. He reported that he and his fiscal
vice president, Prescott Vose, toted up the results at the end of his seven
years and found that the University of Maine had enjoyed a 525 percent
increase in state appropriations over that period.7
President Elliott’s public style was at once aggressive, combatant,
and diplomatic. At the outset, the legislature “challenged” (Elliott’s
word) him to appear before a joint session, which he was only too happy
to do. He said that he did not give a speech, but used the session as a
“question and answer” exchange. A certain legislator kept asking things
like, “Now Mr. President, these students of yours, why should we fund
them at a higher rate?” Elliott leapt upon the phrase with a winning re-
joinder: “Senator, I have only recently arrived in Maine. These are not
MY students. They are YOUR students, the students of your con-
stituents. Don’t you believe they deserve the finest education we can
provide them?” Elliott reported that from that point in the session, the
“questions turned in my direction,” were more and more friendly and
supportive.
This joint session may have been the moment when Elliott’s ap-
proach began to get political traction. But political opportunism and an-
tagonism remained to be reckoned with. In December, 1958, State Sena-
tor Seth Low (a Republican from Rockland) addressed the Rockland
Rotary, claiming that the “low admissions standards of the university. . .
resulted in the admission of a considerable number of students who
gain little from college life other than a fairly convivial sojourn.”8 The
speech gained Elliott’s attention—and concern.
His friend and adviser, Arthur Deering, counseled him to ignore
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Low’s remarks and let them “blow away.” But the University of Maine’s
publicity director, Howard Keyo, agreed with Elliott that the speech
needed to be answered publicly, especially because they had so much ev-
idence to the contrary. Keyo arranged for Elliott to speak at the same Ro-
tary Club two weeks after Low’s speech, and he made sure, according to
Elliott, that “every paper in Maine,” including the weeklies, would have a
reporter present. Elliott also invited Senator Low to attend and sit at the
dais, telling Low that he wanted the senator to be present rather than to
later learn of his remarks second-hand. Low accepted.
Armed with the data assembled by Keyo and Vose, Elliott revealed
that, because of Maine’s relatively low level of state appropriation, a col-
lege applicant in his or her home state of Massachusetts or Connecticut
would have a “30 to 40 percent better chance of getting admitted than a
Maine student applying to the University of Maine.” UMaine was, in
fact, much more highly selective in admissions than the University of
Massachusetts or the University of Connecticut—not because it wanted
to be, but because its enrollment was held down by lack of state funding.
“Tuition at the University of Maine is higher than the average for 87
other public universities. Expenditure per student for instruction is 26
percent lower than the national average for similar institutions,” re-
ported the Lewiston Evening Journal on Elliott’s Rotary Speech. Elliott
told the audience, “I’m going to fight like hell to get more students in
and to get more money.”9
More students did get in. UMaine’s enrollment was 3,933 the fall se-
mester that he arrived (1958), and 5,678 in 1965 when Elliott moved on
to George Washington University. State support had increased as well.
Elliott’s strategy included reaching out to citizens, parents, and lead-
ers across the state. He not only frequently appeared before public
groups, but when he did, he made a point of bringing a trustee or two,
which had the twofold advantage of demonstrating that the board was
with him and helping keep the board itself informed of his talking
points. He also told me of his frequent visits to local reading clubs. He
said he met them “as an old English teacher,” engaged them over their
reading, and filled them in on goings on at the state’s land-grant univer-
sity. Since the women who predominated in these groups were often also
parents, the effect on enrollment was positive.
Elliott’s involvement in the student turmoil of the sixties appears to
be minimal at the University of Maine, where students were not very ac-
tive during his tenure. He said that, other than a few incidents along Fra-
Turmoil and Transformation 
ternity Row, there was little such activity. He also reported that he “and
the faculty never got crosswise with each other.” Only after he moved on
to George Washington University did Elliott face the fierier nature of
student/faculty/administrative confrontations in the 1960s. There he
faced opposition from faculty who were unhappy that an inside candi-
date was passed over in his favor. However, he weathered the initially
strong student and faculty protest to his hiring and went on to serve for
twenty-three years. When he finally retired, press accounts lauded his
work to transform George Washington University from a “sleepy com-
muter college” into a prominent urban university.
On the academic side, Elliott reported that the University of Maine
established few if any new academic programs during his otherwise ex-
pansionist administration. The increased state funding was used to
strengthen existing programs across the board, “from Pulp and Paper to
English,” as Elliott put it. Nor did funded research see much expansion.
Chemical engineering (pulp and paper) and agriculture were essentially
the only programs that enjoyed federal financial support for research.
Elliott, here again, blamed lack of state funding. “We had no matching
funds with which to attract research dollars,” he said, making it a
“chicken and egg” issue. Not until 1998, with the establishment of the
Maine Economic Improvement Fund (MEIF), would the state provide a
financial chicken to produce the research eggs. Moreover, Maine seemed
always to have had influential politicians vehemently opposed to accept-
ing any kind of federal money. Elliott’s nemesis, Bangor Hydro Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer and State Senator Bob Haskell, was such a person. So, al-
though Elliott came to Maine from Cornell, a research powerhouse and
sister land-grant university, expanded research funding was not in the
cards for the University of Maine at this time.
Also not part of Elliott’s significantly transitional presidency, but
waiting in the wings, was the consolidation of public higher education
in Maine into a “system.” This idea began to take political shape from
1965 to 1967, when a state commission, headed by Bowdoin President
James “Spike” Coles, met and eventually drew up plans for creating what
would become the “University of Maine,” appropriating the name of
Maine’s land-grant university and making Orono but one campus of the
new entity. Elliott was aware of those conversations before he left
UMaine and discussed the concept with Coles. Elliott said he argued
against the creation of the system, because of what he predicted would
be deleterious effects on the land-grant flagship university. He was aware
of similar consolidations that had taken place in New York and else-
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University of Maine President Lloyd Elliot escorting President of the United
States John F. Kennedy to an October 1963 ceremony where he received an hon-
orary degree. This visit occurred five weeks before Kennedy’s assassination in
Dallas, Texas.  
where and felt that such reorganizations weakened the lead universities
and inevitably brought them down toward the level of the smaller ones,
rather than elevating those more modest institutions. He argued with
Coles, who according to Elliott, “would have none of it.” Looking back
from 2007, with the advantage of hindsight and history, Elliott’s views
remained unchanged. “From grapevine reports,” he said, he feared that
“the predicted leveling had taken place,” although he also remarked that
“it had taken . . . years for Orono to come back.” Elliott said that he felt
that a coordinating commission, rather than a governing board, should
have been established. The newly-constituted UMaine System Board of
Trustees, like its parallels in other states, took assets away from the lead-
ing institutions in order to assist the smaller ones. Elliott felt that pres-
sure to do this essentially always led system boards and system chief ex-
ecutive officers inadvertently to promote mediocrity by giving in to that
pressure. “Nothing has persuaded me,” he stated firmly in 2007, “that
this is the way to go. The practice of system mongering is never as good
as the theory.”
A bittersweet memory of Elliott’s time in Maine, for all concerned,
was the October 1963 appearance of President John F. Kennedy, barely
five weeks before his assassination in Dallas, Texas. Elliott remembers
(and sixteen-millimeter color footage confirms) that this was a beautiful
fall day, the kind that seemingly only Maine can conjure up. Kennedy
came to Maine to visit Passamaquoddy at the invitation of Senator Ed-
mund Muskie and was hosted at the University of Maine by Maine’s sen-
ior senator Margaret Chase Smith and Governor John Reed.10 According
to Elliott, those three quarreled over who would introduce the president,
and he—Elliott—settled the dispute by introducing Kennedy himself.
The ceremony at the football field, during which President Kennedy re-
ceived an honorary degree, was remembered as an extraordinarily warm
and special moment, permanently fixed and glazed in time by the later
November tragedy. According to Elliott, “everyone loved” the president’s
“perfectly wonderful and non-political speech about the charm, attrac-
tion, and strength of the American Northeast.”
HUGH EDWIN YOUNG (UMaine President Oct. 1, 1965-June 30,
1968):
Upon the departure of Lloyd Elliot, the University of Maine turned
to a native son who had made a name for himself in Wisconsin. H. Ed-
win Young (1917-2012), born in Newfoundland and raised in northern
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Maine, earned bachelor’s (1940) and master’s (1942) degrees from the
University of Maine in economics. He went on for his doctorate at the
University of Wisconsin and became a member of UW’s economics fac-
ulty in 1947, rising to the rank of full professor by 1955. In 1962, he be-
came UW’s dean of Arts and Sciences, and the University of Maine cele-
brated his achievement by awarding him an honorary doctorate in 1963.
Thus he was clearly on the University of Maine’s radar when they
went looking for a president to succeed Elliott in 1965. Young gladly ac-
cepted Maine’s offer and became his alma mater’s new leader October 1
of that year. Young’s inauguration downplayed the pomp and ceremony
of the occasion, and established an academic colloquium, which encap-
sulated the installation event itself.11 The colloquium’s theme was “The
Tensions of our Times” and featured a number of nationally distin-
guished scholars, including superstar literary theorist Northrop Frye.
If this entry were about Edwin Young at the University of Wisconsin,
it would be voluminous and dramatic. There he earned his PhD in eco-
nomics and joined the faculty, quickly earning an international reputa-
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University of Maine President Hugh Young seated next to Vice President Hubert
Humphrey at convocation in 1968.
tion as a scholar of New Deal economics. He was promoted to full pro-
fessor a mere five years after earning his doctorate and named dean of
one of the nation’s largest and most prestigious colleges of letters and
sciences only a few years later. He then went back to Maine as presi-
dent—essentially “on loan” or “in training” as it turned out—only to re-
turn to Wisconsin in 1968. Technically he returned as a “vice president,”
but, within about two months, Young was named Chancellor of the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison.12
Extant documents tell us little of Edwin Young’s presidential years in
Orono. He faced in Maine the same matters that would concern him in
Wisconsin. Student confrontations and protests were just beginning in
Maine then, but were a growing phenomenon. In the student prose
about the administration in the University of Maine’s yearbook, Prism,
the Elliot years continued to reflect student respect for administrators.
During the Young administration, Prism referred to leaders as “rarely
seen” individuals who struggled to balance conflicting concerns. That
same 1968 Prism noted that Young was moving on to “greener pastures,”
wryly suggesting that he was leaving the hardscrabble environment of
Maine for a better opportunity.
War and mild student protest was only part of the apprenticeship
Young served in Maine. His tenure in Maine placed him in the midst of
the birth pangs of the new statewide system, allowing him to see a
“movie” that would ironically come back for a rerun when he returned
to Wisconsin. It was Young’s lot to serve as the head of the Orono cam-
pus, known until 1969 as “The University of Maine,” while the state was
in the process of creating a different “University of Maine.”
President Young and the Creation of the University System:
Although we know little about Edwin Young’s role in the creation of
the system, an event that was to have a profound effect on the University
of Maine’s future, it did occur during his presidency, and he did play a
role. When Lloyd Elliott departed for George Washington University in
1965, the University of Maine System was but a dream of influential
Mainers. We noted Elliott’s conversation with Bowdoin president, James
Coles, who had, in the spring of 1965, just been named to head the Advi-
sory Commission for the Higher Education Study, and their disagree-
ment about what should be done. Some observers even claim that Young
left the Maine presidency because of the consolidation. By the time Ed-
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win Young departed for Madison in 1968, Maine’s University System was
a done deal. The “consolidation” took place on his watch.
Young was in fact a member of that “Advisory Commission”—often
referred to as the “Coles Commission.” What he did or said and how he
acted as a member is not well documented. However, what the commis-
sion itself recommended was a far better arrangement for the Orono
campus than the consolidation that emerged from the subsequent legis-
lation. Thus the work Young himself participated in, had it not been al-
tered, was something he himself might have favored. The initial legisla-
tion creating the commission, enacted March 30, 1965, directed it to
study higher education “access” and mentioned nothing more, stating:
“Whereas a study should be immediately instituted to the end that no
qualified Maine youth should be denied the opportunity for higher edu-
cation.” This limitation did not stop the commission from broadening
its mission well beyond mere “access.” 
The Coles Commission members, primarily state officials and the
heads of educational units likely to be affected by consolidation, were
“The President of the University of Maine, the Commissioner of Educa-
tion, the Commissioner of Economic Development, . . . a president of a
teachers college, a president of a private college, a principal of a voca-
tional-technical institute, a member of the Governor’s Advisory Com-
mittee on Education, an executive of a junior college, a member of the
House of Representatives, a member of the Senate, a representative from
industry and a representative from labor.” The Commission began work
in 1965 and finished in January, 1967 with a report to the governor and
the legislature. It began by contracting with an outside consulting group,
the Academy for Educational Development (AED). The AED had been
formed in 1961 and still maintains a website today, although its mission
has been completely redefined. By 1963, according to James Libby, AED
was already “a well-known national nonprofit organization.”13
The AED, in turn, formed a consultant panel, led by James A. Mc-
Cain, president of Kansas State University, and including six other highly
regarded educational leaders from across the nation. It also subcon-
tracted with six other experts to provide data, analysis, and suggestions.
Its formal report to the Coles Commission arrived in September, 1966, a
125-page report entitled, THE FIRST BUSINESS OF OUR TIMES: A Re-
port to the Advisory Commission for the Higher Education Study, State of
Maine (September 30, 1966).
This AED report itself was a remarkable document. It served as both
a blueprint and a road map for creating a higher education system in the
state of Maine that, had it been followed fully and completely, could
have made Maine the envy of the nation for the comprehensive excel-
lence of its higher education institutions and programs. Exquisitely re-
searched and compellingly written, it identified Maine’s higher educa-
tion shortcomings and proposed a comprehensive solution. It does not
mince words: “as good as Maine’s system of higher education has been
for the needs of the past, the Consultant Panel does not believe that the
present organization and structure of this system is adequate either for
the present or the future.” It presents an extremely long list of the alleged
failings of Maine’s status quo:
Enrollment on one- and two-year programs of a terminal or transfer
nature is surprisingly low.
In public institutions nearly one-third of enrollment in four-year pro-
grams is for teacher education.
Graduate and professional enrollment is 3 per cent of total; nationally
this figure is 10 per cent.
The full-time enrollment in Maine higher education institutions rep-
resents 15 per cent of the 18 to 24 year-olds in the state of Maine. The
national average . . . is 20 per cent.
Today confusion in vocational and technical education pervades every
aspect of this important program area.
A diversity of quality post-secondary two-year technical and voca-
tional programs is a seriously underdeveloped aspect of higher educa-
tion in Maine.
Enrollment projections by the vocational-technical institutes for 1970
and 1975 are unrealistically low. . . . On the other hand, the criteria
used in the State Department of Education’s recent proposal . . . em-
ploys questionable criteria which could result in too many centers with
enrollment much too small to support solid curriculum offerings.
. . . Many substantive programs are possible in career areas which are
not related to just heavy and light industry or agriculture. In Califor-
nia, over 100 different associate-degree programs, (i.e.) in health, edu-
cation, social work, business, . . . food services, and government serv-
ice. . .
In 1928 (the former last time such a statewide study was carried out) a
serious shortage of graduate education in the state was recognized. . . .
Efforts to improve the situation were slow to materialize. From 1923,
when the Division of Graduate Study was established at the University
of Maine, to the present, a total of 29 PhDs have been awarded in the
state of Maine, the first in 1960.
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Graduate training for social work is not provided in Maine.
Maine ranks 48th among the states in the preparation of doctorates
and last among the states in the proportion of its citizens who seek
graduate education.
Among the New England states, Maine has the highest percentage of
faculty members who have obtained only the bachelor’s degree and the
next to lowest percentage of faculty who have obtained the doctorate
of highest professional degree in their field.
More time should be spent on research. . . (The University of Maine)
should be producing 90 to 100 PhDs per year.
There is a serious absence of graduate programs in science and engi-
neering for the benefit of the employees of manufacturing plants in
the state’s southern industrial center.
We could find little evidence in Maine which would suggest that insti-
tutions were familiar with the many approaches to better utilization of
faculty and facilities, let alone examples of serious efforts to employ
them.
The state of Maine today has a serious shortage of qualified teachers
and administrators to staff the public schools.
(Of the state colleges) Only Farmington and Gorham State Colleges,
which have regional and NCATE accreditation, have received approval
for secondary teacher-education programs. Of the three other state
colleges, each very small, only Aroostook State College seems likely to
receive regional accreditation in the foreseeable future.
. . . because special attention will have to be given to strengthening
many aspects of public higher education, costs of providing educa-
tional programs will be considerably higher than estimates by the in-
stitutions suggest they might be.
To be average for the nation today with respect to organized research,
Maine’s institutions of higher education should in toto be spending
$10 million or about four times what they are now spending for re-
search.
In 1961-62, for the nation as a whole, state and local funds for the sup-
port of education programs in public institutions averaged 67.9 per
cent of the total. In Maine, for the same year, only 44 per cent of edu-
cation program expenses were covered by state and local funds. Only
two states had poorer records.
In 1965 state expenditures for public institutions of higher education
in Maine . . . amounted to $20 per capita of population. In the same
year, 31 states spent over $40 per capita for public higher education,
and only nine states spent less than Maine. 
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The Consultant Panel believes that Maine has the resources and can
afford the expenditures which will be required. The Consultant Panel
suspects, however, that few people in the state of Maine fully appreci-
ate the time, money, stress, initiative, and imagination required to
build a strong institution, let alone a cohesive and comprehensive sys-
tem of public higher education.
The AED consultant panel thus identified, in vivid and clear-eyed
terms, many serious deficiencies in Maine higher education. It also pro-
vided detailed advice on how to overcome those deficiencies. Central to
all the advice was the creation of a single state system of higher educa-
tion, which would incorporate all public institutions, the vocational-
technical schools, the Maritime Academy, the state colleges, the Univer-
sity of Maine, and all the branches and outreach centers across the state.
Also of importance to the panel was closer cooperation and coordina-
tion with private colleges and universities. Equally as central was the
message that Maine would only get what it paid for. Excellence—or even
mere adequacy—was going to cost the state money, but the expenditure
would be, in the report’s view, well worth it.
Although the Coles Commission incorporated virtually all of the
AED’s recommendations in its own October 31, 1966 draft report, which
emerged as a trial balloon, one significant aspect of the AED’s proposed
plan had already been axed: AED recommended that the new consoli-
dated system be constructed on the foundation of the University of
Maine itself. The University of Maine’s Board of Trustees, expanded
from ten to fifteen members, would have become the governing board of
the new system, with the Orono campus as the foundation. That one
critical item became the first victim as the process of politicization be-
gan chipping away at the grand scheme envisioned by the AED consult-
ing panel.
This October 31 trial balloon was entitled HIGHER EDUCATION
IN THE STATE OF MAINE, Tentative Report of the ADVISORY COM-
MISSION OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION STUDY. Where the AED re-
port was 125 pages long, the commission draft ran thirty-three double-
spaced pages, typewritten; the final (January 14, 1967) version ran
twenty-three single-spaced pages, printed. The draft explained its rela-
tive brevity by referring interested readers to the original AED report.
Most notably omitted from the October commission draft were the
many indictments of Maine’s educational shortcomings listed above, as
well as its elaborate and detailed plea for a more robust state investment.
In other words, the commission became the first entity to say in effect,
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“yes, we like the idea of a higher education system, but we are not eager
to pay for it.”
The October draft made recommendations almost identical to the
AED report, with one exception that was highly significant to the Uni-
versity of Maine itself. Whereas the AED called for all higher education
units to be consolidated under the University of Maine and its existing
board, the Coles Commission in October called instead for a brand-new
board of trustees to oversee all of higher education in Maine, calling the
consolidation a brand-new university: “The University of the State of
Maine.” The University of Maine was to be one unit belonging to the
University of the State of Maine. To be sure, it would be the only “uni-
versity” belonging to the new “university,” an awkward concept in itself.
All the other units would be colleges and schools located in various parts
of the state, and only three (Gorham, Farmington, and Presque Isle)
would be four-year “colleges.” Machias and Fort Kent were to offer two-
year programs only, as would the proposed “university community cen-
ters” at Portland, Auburn, Augusta, and Bangor (the “Dow” campus).
However, the draft still called for the inclusion of the Maine Maritime
Academy and Vocational-Technical education.
The discussion period (November-December, 1966) included meet-
ings with a long list of stakeholders—mostly governing boards and lead-
ers of Maine higher education institutions, as well as government com-
mittees. These are listed in the commission’s final report, which,
significantly, does not mention any public forums or meetings with fac-
ulty or student groups. Subsequently, the final REPORT OF THE ADVI-
SORY COMMISSION FOR THE HIGHER EDUCATION STUDY went
to Governor Kenneth M. Curtis and the Maine State Legislature on Jan-
uary 14, 1967. While it was dressed up by a formal print job and a great
deal of editing, its essence and most of its language came verbatim from
the original AED report.
The January report cited the legislature’s “dissatisfaction with the
situation as it presently exists” and listed major shortcomings in Maine
higher education, including low rates of postsecondary attendance, the
state’s failure to invest in higher education, its failure to seek federal re-
search funding, the always-popular indictment of “duplication of serv-
ices,” and predictions of an oncoming tidal wave of students. The report,
like the October draft, proposed the establishment of “The University of
the State of Maine,” which would include “all existing public higher edu-
cation institutions in the State of Maine, including the University, the
five State Colleges, the four Vocational-Technical Institutes, the Mar-
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itime Academy, and any branches, campuses, or schools maintained by
any of these institutions and any future public higher education institu-
tions which might be established.” Among the most salient recommen-
dations were as follows:
These units and their assets should be transferred to the trustees of the
University of the State of Maine on July 1, 1968.
The new University was to have a board of 15 members, who would ap-
point the university’s “President,” to whom campus CEOs—chancellors,
provosts, and deans (depending on size and scope of unit) would report.
All Maine citizens shall be considered eligible for the benefits of higher
education.
The Board of trustees would be responsible for creating a “Master Plan”
for Maine higher education.
The Board would develop a “division of responsibility” for all units.
All campus/unit heads would report to the President, who would be the
one responsible for all communication with the governor and legislature
on matters of budget.
All faculty members at these units would be considered faculty of the
University of the State of Maine. 
At least 90% of Mainers should be within 40 miles of at least a two-year
college education.
There would be “full transferability of credits.”
(In spite of greater centralization and consolidation) there should also
be “greater autonomy for individual campuses.”
Greatly increase research for economic development, especially in the
southern part of state.
Encourage industry by creating high tech work force
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Oversee all teacher preparation (including cooperative arrangements
with private institutions.)
In keeping with the thrust of the AED report, the Coles Commis-
sion’s January report called upon the state itself to step up and provide
much more adequate funding, stating: 
“The legislature should anticipate making a substantially higher com-
mitment of state revenues in the future to the support of public higher
education programs.”
Higher faculty salaries
Improvement of libraries
Strengthening graduate and professional programs, and research
Increased support of economic development
Strengthening vocational-technical education
Planning
Accommodate increased enrollment
“Make maximum use of Federal funds available.” The State should pro-
vide matching funds (“initially and on a continuing basis”).
“Immediate and adequate public support by the state of Maine for
scholarships, fellowships, and student loans.”14
While Elliott and other University of Maine presidents were on
record expressing a preference for a “coordinating” board rather than a
“governing” board, Young, a member of the Coles Commission, voiced
no public dissent. He may have wanted the positive items among the
recommendations: dramatic increases in funding to boost faculty
salaries, improved libraries, and building the facilities that could accom-
modate the expected tidal wave of new students, and to be more aggres-
sive in pursuing federal funding and engaging in research. The effects of
a fully implemented plan and fully-funded university system could have
been extremely good for the state and also beneficial to its flagship (and
at the time, its only) university. On the other hand, it was also possible
that Young saw the handwriting on the wall, and was by January already
planning his escape back to Wisconsin.
More to the point, the differences between what the commission
proposed and what the state created were stark, although it took several
years for the full array of consequences to emerge. Whereas the AED re-
port was a comprehensive blueprint and road map to educational excel-
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lence, the state legislature treated it instead as an a la cartemenu, picking
and choosing the appetizers they would order and even determining
how little they wished to spend. These menu choices emerged in the
form of State Statutes, Chapter 229, “An ACT Relating to Coordination
of Public Higher Education” (passed in the house on 1/22/68, the senate
on 1/25/68 and signed into law on 1/29/68).
The vocational-technical schools and the Maritime Academy
wanted no part of membership in this consolidated system, and they
had the political clout to opt out. They managed to work the legislature
to do so before the bill was passed. Hence, they are not even mentioned
in the act. The higher education system that was created, therefore, in-
cluded only six entities: “University of Maine, Gorham State College,
Farmington State College, Aroostook State College, Washington State
College, and Fort Kent State College.” While the act never actually gave a
name to the new system, it consistently refers to the newly created sys-
tem as “the university,” and declared, for example, that the state colleges
would be given new names such as, “Aroostook State College of the Uni-
versity of Maine.” It does not, however, make them branch campuses of
what was until this point known as the “University of Maine.” The impli-
cation was clear. The University of Maine was having its name comman-
deered by the state and given over to the newly-created system. The 
resolve did not state what the statewide land-grant university headquar-
tered in Orono would henceforth be called. The Coles Commission had
deftly avoided this slight to the flagship by calling its proposed new sys-
tem “The University of the State of Maine.” A name such as “The Univer-
sity System of Maine,” would also have avoided this slight.15
More substantively, discussion around the consolidation issue
boasted that the smaller campuses would be raised in quality to that of
the University of Maine, but said nothing of increasing the excellence
and stature of the land-grant university itself. The very leveling and
mediocritization that Elliott predicted was already underway. The act it-
self appropriated $103,700 “to carry out the purposes of this act.” Even
in 1968, $103,700 would not even have been sufficient to establish and
staff a system office (which the resolve said was to be located in Au-
gusta). To be fair, however, appropriations to the new system did grow
significantly during its first years. A report issued by the University of
Maine System in 2011 lists Fiscal Year 1968 state appropriation to 
the system as $17,058,403. By Fiscal Year 1976 it had increased to
$36,468,544.
Even though enrollment growth estimates verged on mind-bog-
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gling, the entire process failed to take into account (or even imagine) the
large numbers of older, place-bound “non-traditional” students who
would in fact become the primary constituency of the regional cam-
puses. From the legislation creating the commission, to the commission
itself, to the consolidation act, the language repeatedly refers to the
“youth of Maine,” who would be served. From the beginning, and cer-
tainly today, many of the campuses not located in Orono had great diffi-
culty maintaining a critical mass of students without the degree-seeking
working adults who depend on them for educational opportunities.
The most significant changes between the initial report and the new
university system as actually created were the exemption of the Mar-
itime Academy and vocational-technical schools from the consolidation,
the change from consolidating all units under the existing University of
Maine and instead creating a new entity, which appropriated the Univer-
sity of Maine’s name.
The creation of a new governing board and the appointment of a
new system chief executive officer (“chancellor”) established a new dy-
namic that altered the course of events in Maine higher education. James
Libby’s book, Super U, states that, “It was the final compromise state leg-
islation that led to a unified University of Maine System that drew the
interest of [Donald] McNeil, a rising administrator in the Wisconsin
public higher education system,” and who became Maine’s first univer-
sity-system chancellor.16 While the legislation had called for the system
office to be located in Augusta, the new Board of Trustees compromised
again in order to land McNeil, allowing him to establish the new system
office in Portland, so that he could live in nearby Cape Elizabeth.17
Within months of the passage of Chapter 229, Young accepted the offer
to return to Wisconsin as vice president. A few months later, he became
chancellor of the University of Wisconsin’s Madison campus.
Winthrop Libby (UMaine President July 1, 1968-August 1, 1973):
When H. Edwin Young returned to Madison for a future that proved
even more turbulent than he could have imagined, the University of
Maine turned inward rather than outward for its next president, and yet
picked someone who had much in common with him. Like Young,
Winthrop Libby hailed from what Mainers call “The County” (Aroost-
ook County). He too was an economist (an agricultural one) who
earned his bachelor’s and master’s degrees at Orono. Like Deering and
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Elliott, he also spent time at Cornell. Libby was head of the University of
Maine’s Agricultural Experiment Station when he was tapped in July to
serve as acting president. The interim appointment became permanent
when the new board of trustees convened in April, 1969. The years that
followed also proved similar for Young and Libby. Both weathered the
height of the student protest era, enduring savage verbal attacks from
their young adversaries. Both were in the flagship leadership seat when
their campuses were engulfed by a larger entity. And, in the end, both re-
ceived glowing encomiums when the tumult was over. Both retired
much loved and respected by those who knew them.
A nation bitterly divided by issues of war and race and, in the minds
of some, close to outright revolution, fought many of its battles on col-
lege campuses. Orono was hardly immune, though, in general, the
protests were far less violent than at places like Berkeley, Madison, Co-
lumbia, and ultimately Kent State. Academic year 1969-1970 proved the
most difficult for campus administrators, featuring controversies over
student rights (e.g., residence hall rules, alcohol on campus, and partici-
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Winthrop Libby (left), President of the University of Maine from July 1, 1968 to
August 1, 1973 meeting with an unnamed student. Libby, dealt with student
protests during his tenure, including antiwar protestors—with Stephen King
among their ranks—threatening to burn the president’s house down.
pation in campus governance). It was a year when students rose up to
defend popular professors threatened with dismissal by the administra-
tion. Collective emotions hit the boiling point often during that year.
Libby consistently worked to remind everyone what the university was
about—an academic institution dedicated to the rational quest for
truth. He did his very best to be the peacemaker, and he generally pre-
vailed, but not without moments of institutional collapse. At least twice
(September and March), he called for, and got, two-day moratoriums in
the hubbub. Still the crises kept returning.
A memorable moment occurred when antiwar protesters, with un-
dergraduate student Stephen King among those leading the way, went to
the President’s House with the avowed goal of burning it down. King
himself has narrated the story of what happened. President Libby met
the crowd at the door and invited its leaders to come in and talk. It was
friendly and productive. Libby showed his humane genuineness and
participated in a frank and sympathetic discussion of the crowd’s con-
cerns. While the leaders remained adamantly antiwar, in spite of their
original determination to burn the house to show the world how
strongly they felt, they backed away from this act, and the demonstration
ended peacefully. One eyewitness account stated:
In 1970 students stormed his house screaming about strikes. He came
to his porch and it was obvious that he was hurt. He wanted to listen to
us, to talk about Kent State. And all we did was scream at him. (The
Movement vs. the Establishment). Finally a small group sat down with
him and while the masses yelled away all the good jargon they had ever
learned, Win listened, he argued, and finally an agreement was made
and UMO held a two-day moratorium to try to put the pieces to-
gether.18
This one anecdote, repeated variously by a number of former students
who witnessed it, encapsulates Libby’s leadership qualities. He under-
stood and sympathized with the passions that drove so many in those
difficult days. He dealt with anger and outrage over many concerns: the
war, racial and ethnic inequality, damage to the environment, university
politics and infighting, the birth pangs of the new university system.
None of these issues was the subject of mere academic and rational dis-
cussion. All were flashpoints for conflict and even violence. The univer-
sity was often the battleground, even though it was seldom responsible
for the problem. Libby proved to be the right person to play this most
difficult of roles.
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When Libby retired in 1973, he was universally celebrated for his ex-
ceptional work. Even those who had shaken their fists at him recognized
his efforts and acknowledged his achievements. Graduating senior, Pa-
tricia “Trish” Riley, then president of student government, wrote these
words in her Prism tribute to Libby:
In 1969, the first year of the Libby administration, we entered UMO
with dreams and aspirations that have since been twisted, deadened,
forgotten, revitalized, and sometimes achieved. . .. Throughout it all,
Win Libby is leaving, and once more we rally to the group, to the slo-
gan (“This Win is our loss”), to the cause (“do it for Win”). President
Libby has retained his compassion and his sensitivity to people despite
his role as administrator. His five years were riddled with an intense
student upheaval and a national mood that something was very wrong
with the higher education. Win Libby believed in us, he listened to our
dreams and horrors—he shared it all. He moved with us without los-
ing touch with the community or the faculty. He broke down the myth
of the untouchable administrator by refusing to accept the role. By his
strength, he made the title secondary to the person.19
A Brave New Academic World: Membership in the “Super-University”:
Winthrop Libby was the first University of Maine president to re-
port to a chief executive officer rather than to his own governing board.
This change was anything but inconsequential. While Libby handled the
usual administrative matters of the university and dealt with several
years of campus turmoil, the newly formed university system (The “Uni-
versity of Maine”) was busy getting its act together. Governor Curtis ap-
pointed a new board of trustees. A Wisconsin press release on December
13, 1968 first announced University of Wisconsin Extension Chancellor
David McNeil’s appointment as the first chancellor of the University of
Maine System. McNeil did not arrive until sometime early in 1969, but
the act said the consolidation was to take place thirty days after its effec-
tive date. People must have been scurrying to get the basics done. At least
one source says that Winthrop Libby served as the executive head of the
new entity before McNeil arrived. Although this makes sense, it remains
unconfirmed.
McNeil’s appointment was not only announced December 13, 1968,
it was effective that same day. First, there was the debate and negotiation
about the location of the office. McNeil wanted Portland and got it.
Space needed to be located, staff hired, and equipment purchased. Even
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though the consolidation legislation had been in place through much of
1968, the last-minute decision as to office location must have created a
mad scramble.
Don McNeil’s paper credentials made him appear to be the ideal
candidate. He was a war hero with liberal arts degrees from University of
Washington (BA) and University of Wisconsin (MA and PhD), served as
Wisconsin President Fred Harvey Harrington’s right-hand man, and was
named by Harrington as the chancellor of the statewide University of
Wisconsin Extension. The first extension leader not to be an agricultur-
alist, he made university extension far more than agricultural extension.
It was a full realization of the famous “Wisconsin Idea,” that “the Bound-
aries of the Campus are the Boundaries of the State.” Thus, McNeil al-
ready handled a major statewide consolidation and, by all accounts, had
done it well. However, Edmund Cronon and John Jenkins’ history of the
University of Wisconsin suggests that McNeil had seemed detached
from the extension work, leaving the tasks to others, and traveled to
Africa during the fall semester before signing on with Maine.20
The hasty organizational work to create a system administration
from the typewriters and file cabinets up must have been dizzying
(bringing to mind the image of building an airplane while it is in flight);
and, all the while, McNeil recognized the need to focus on broad strate-
gic thinking. The interesting thing, writ large, about Maine’s higher edu-
cation strategy and action in the late 1960s was that, again and again, ex-
tensive and soundly researched reports had told Maine officials
essentially the same thing. From our twenty-first century viewpoint,
they sound like Greek oracles or the chorus of a Greek tragedy. To para-
phrase the consistent message: 
Maine is a geographically large state with a small population and a
modest economy. Its people are distributed (albeit unevenly) across all
that geography, but concentrate mainly in two areas. There is a critical
need for improved access to higher education and its benefits. Fiscal
reality, though, dictates careful planning and frugal (though vastly ex-
panded) investment. Therefore, vocational, liberal, and cultural educa-
tion need to be consolidated in comprehensive community colleges
that must be located within reach of all Mainers. Four year universities
(one or two offering graduate degrees) should be few in number and
geographically distributed.
The AED Report brought this message, and, for the most part, the Coles
Commission echoed it. But politics had dismembered key elements of
these clear recommendations. The legislature had exempted vocational-
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technical education as well as the Maritime Academy from the consoli-
dation, leaving only six named entities in what was supposed to be a
statewide consolidation, and essentially ruling out the possibility of true
comprehensive community colleges.
In the spring of 1969, Chancellor McNeil commissioned yet another
group to report on the same subject. This time, it was a group of re-
spected citizens that became known as the Higher Education Planning
Commission (HEPC). It soon reported:
While we have some educators in our group, we are basically a cross-
section of the citizenry, our twenty-eight members coming from many
walks of life. Our role is to build upon the Coles Report, to face con-
crete problems in the light of that report’s statement of goals. Accord-
ingly, we have not hired outside consultants but have relied on Univer-
sity staff, the experience of our members, and our discussions with
education officials, groups, and administrators.
This commission focused mainly on two thorny issues: two-year post-
secondary education and the missions of the various units of the newly-
formed system. Their conclusions were remarkably similar to those of
the AED and the Coles Commission. Again they called for unification of
two-year university centers and the vocational-technical schools into
one statewide set of comprehensive community colleges. As for the
larger units, the HEPC said there should be four, four-year university
“centers”: a comprehensive one without graduate education in the north
(Presque Isle), two that would develop graduate and research agendas
(the land-grant university in Orono, and a four-year university center
emerging from the confluence of several campuses and the law school in
the South), plus an undergraduate college in Farmington that would de-
velop liberal-arts programs to support its primary function of teacher
preparation. Machias, Fort Kent, and Augusta would remain two-year
institutions of a community college nature, emphasizing associate de-
grees for transfer, vocational training, and community enrichment. A
telling statistic revealed by the HEPC reveals that the state’s leaders
needed to know: “Maine exceeds California by two percentage points in
four-year college enrollments per 100,000 population. By contrast, Cali-
fornia’s enrollment per 100,000 in institutions offering less than four
years of college work exceeds Maine’s comparable record by more than
1100%.”
There it was in stark numbers. Maine had not stepped up to serve its
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widely distributed population by creating community colleges that were
within geographical and monetary reach of everyone, but had attempted
to create more expensive and generally tiny four-year colleges (soon to
be “universities”) that neither the students nor the state could afford.
California had found the answer and demonstrated proof of concept.
The commission had shown Maine this better way. Did the state listen?
Did Chancellor McNeil’s new board of trustees listen? Sadly, no. A
month after the advisory commission report, the board of trustees is-
sued its own report to the governor, the legislature, and the state. It did
not echo the commission’s call for integrating the vocational-technical
schools and the two-year centers into comprehensive community col-
leges. Instead, in language that has become hackneyed in the world of
such reports, it stated, “We resolve that steps be taken to bring the Uni-
versity and the VTI’s (Vocational-Technical Institutes) into a closer rela-
tionship and that there be further study by the Board of Education and
the Board of Trustees.” As for differentiated missions, the following were
listed:
We resolve that Fort Kent State College be a four-year campus of
the university. . . .
We resolve that Washington State College be a four-year campus of
the university. . . .
We resolve that Aroostook State College be a four-year campus of
the university. . . .
We resolve that Farmington State College be a four-year college of
the university. . . .
To be sure, there were codicils that specified the ways in which their
missions would differ a bit. But the opportunity to structure the system
more along the lines of California’s master plan was gone forever. No
comprehensive community colleges were established; instead, four four-
year colleges (soon to be five and soon all to be named “universities” in
spite of their three-figure enrollments) became the norm.
The commission’s text acknowledges that, “We would have wished
more time even for this first part of our work. We would have liked to be
able to say that we had talked with everyone who had something to say
on these problems. But further delay in setting new directions would
have meant a year irrevocably lost for many young people.” As it turns
out, that extra time might have worked wonders for future generations,
even if it was (and “if ” is the operative word) costly to that year’s
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prospects. On the other hand, given the state’s record, more time might
well not have achieved a better result. Witness the next shoe dropped
near the end of the forty-seven-page document: “The Commission rec-
ognizes that its recommendations will be controversial. It suggests,
therefore, that the Chancellor of the University of Maine should seek out
comments and reactions from individuals and groups who are most di-
rectly concerned.” In light of what followed, one has to wonder whether
there was a hint of schadenfreud in the recommendation.
To be fair to the commission, the chancellor, and the board of
trustees, the proverbial toothpaste had little chance of returning to the
tube. Subsequent events at the Machias campus demonstrated this.
In September 1952 Washington State Normal School became Wash-
ington State Teachers College, a four-year granting institution. . . . The
first Bachelor of Science degree was conferred in June of 1953. . . . In
the late 1950’s enrollment began to grow rapidly. . . . From a low of
eighty-five students in 1956-57, the enrollment grew to one hundred
forty-three in 1959-60. The campus realized not only new construc-
tion but also program expansion. In 1959 the State Board of Education
authorized the college to develop a Business Education curriculum for
the preparation of teachers for secondary schools. The first Business
Education students entered Washington State Teachers’ College in
September, 1960. . . . More changes for the campus came through leg-
islative action. In 1965 the Maine State Legislature authorized the five
state teachers’ colleges to remove the word “Teachers” from their
names, and Washington State Teachers College became Washington
State College. . . . During this period enrollment continued to spiral
(sic). In fall of 1963 two hundred eighty-nine students were enrolled,
but by the fall of 1969, the enrollment was four hundred.21
Given these facts, no one familiar with educational politics was sur-
prised by what occurred on December 2, 1969, when Chancellor Mc-
Neil, presumably following up on his commission’s advice, arrived in
Machias to “seek out comments and reactions” on the recommendation
to return Machias to two-year status. Maine Sunday Telegram writer
William Williamson recorded the events in an article entitled “‘Twas Hot
Night in Machias for UM Chancellor!” (December 7, 1969).
Nearly 2,000 of those residents (Washington County) jammed and
squeezed into the college auditorium and several classrooms . . . Dr.
McNeil had come to get the response of area residents to the Higher
Education Planning Commission (HEP) report, and he got it. Wash-
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ington County treated the whole business as a gigantic insult, and re-
sponded as a united block. For the first time in recorded county his-
tory, white men cheered as Indians spoke, and vice versa. As WSC Pro-
fessor George Thurston . . . suggested, the HEP proposal had such a
uniting effect as to cause ‘the lion to lie down with the lamb, and the
Rotary now agree with the Lions, the Baptists with the Congregation-
alists, Machias with Calais, students with faculty, politicians with vot-
ers, and even the Democrats with the Republicans.
The meeting opened with several minutes of standing ovation for (cam-
pus) President Lincoln Sennett. This ovation; the series of ten minute
speeches from the community members, faculty, administration, and
students; and the one-minute testimonies of legislators illustrated such
support that Dr. McNeil on December 18 recommended to the board of
trustees that Machias remain a four year campus.22
Doubtless Dr. McNeil heard similar comments and reactions
throughout the state in the month that intervened between the commis-
sion report and the board’s report to the state. The politics of higher ed-
ucation seemed to include a ratchet phenomenon that allows institu-
tions to move in only one direction, regardless of actual circumstances.
Universities never became colleges. Four-year institutions never reverted
to two-year status. And woe betide the politician who sought to elimi-
nate any institution once established. Enrollments may decline, budgets
may be cut, reputations may collapse, but the name and official status of
an educational institution only moved upward.
Structure was one matter—and we see how far short of the planning
vision the actual structure came to be. Funding was another. Again the
committees, commissions, and leading administrators had all come to
the same conclusion: doing higher education in Maine was going to cost
money—a lot more money than Mainers were used to committing to the
cause. No one tried to hide this reality in messages to the governor and
legislature. One governor at least—Kenneth Curtis—truly seemed to un-
derstand the size of the investment in capital and operating expenses it
took to realize the ambition of keeping Maine competitive with the rest
of the country when it came to higher education. The stakes were high.
He knew that only with sufficient investment and wise financial decisions
could Maine hope to elevate its higher education system. With the politi-
cization of key structural decisions such as whether a college was two-
year or four-year, the state was already spending money unwisely before it
even raised an allocation or a bond issue. Keeping the vocational-techni-
cal system out of the mix was expensive and counterproductive. 
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It appears the vocational-technical leaders never had the least inter-
est in such amalgamation. Their fears of being swallowed up and be-
coming deprived stepchildren of a more “elite” university system per-
haps had some basis. But that merger was critical to the vision of
enhanced higher education in Maine; and failure to push through even a
shotgun wedding was bleeding the state’s money even without enhanced
allocations. The Maritime Academy involved, perhaps, some different is-
sues. It is worth pointing out, though, that California had a fine Mar-
itime Academy that became part of the California State University Sys-
tem with no apparent ill effects.
Kenneth Curtis (in office 1967-1975) proved to be a most support-
ive governor. Under his administration, a fair amount of the needed in-
crease in operating money began to flow. In 1972, Bangor Daily News
Reporter Richard Hertz summed up the good and bad news regarding
UMS funding in the early years of the “Super-U:”
State support for the University of Maine the year of the merger, 1967-
68, was $15 million; in the next four years it went up to $22.3 million,
$24.8 million, and 26.2 million. For 1972-73 state support is projected
at $27.1 million. . .. state subsidy per student went from $1,283 in 67-
68 to $1,346 for 72-73.
In the first year of the merger, the legislature increased support 21% to
$1,424 per student in what many regard as the heyday of education.
Then campus disorder and tax revolt swept the country and the state
and the lawmakers felt the pinch. . . .
Another indication of legislative reluctance toward the university
may be seen in the decreasing percentage of money granted, compared
with money requested.
The biennium before the merger, the lawmakers gave the university
$500,000 more than asked for; but in the three subsequent legislatures,
the university got $700,000 and $1.5 million, and $24 million cut from
budget requests.23
On the equally important capital-funding side for a university sys-
tem whose enrollments were rapidly growing, Chancellor McNeil and
Governor Curtis fared poorly. They needed buildings in which to in-
struct and house the growing numbers. “The university has increased
more than 65% in the past five years to 19,434,” reported Hertz in the
same 1972 article.24 However, in 1969 and 1970, Maine voters turned
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down the new system’s first two capital bond proposals. Finally, in No-
vember, 1972, a significant but insufficient bond referendum passed, au-
thorizing $8,360,000 for classrooms across the University of Maine Sys-
tem.25 In terms of both operating money and capital, Mainers fell far
short of meeting their side of the bargain proposed by those who created
the University of Maine System. Consolidation was achieved; the money
necessary to make the consolidated system effective never arrived.
Most accounts suggested that Chancellor McNeil never successfully
connected with his constituencies, and, as a result, his administration
fell far short of its ambitions. Immediately, an uproar about the home in
Cape Elizabeth the system was purchasing for him caused the board to
back off and limit him to a $5,000-per-year housing allowance. McNeil’s
siting the system office in Portland never sat well with those north of the
Kennebec River. Nor did his insistence on employing a chauffeur. System
faculty members, long used to having policy matters decided on their re-
spective campuses, protested that they felt “powerless and far removed
from the power center.” 26 The Orono Student Senate called for McNeil’s
resignation after members learned that the annual budget for operating
the chancellor’s office was $280,000.27
In 1974, a gubernatorial candidate far less friendly to public higher
education appeared. Campaigning, James Longley “stated, that if
elected, he would find a replacement for McNeil and appoint a citizens’
committee to restructure the board.”28 The budget-slashing Longley in-
deed won election, and by December, McNeil announced that he was
leaving for California to take over its higher education coordinating
board, CPEC.
What, then, did the University of Maine’s first chancellor accom-
plish during his five years in office? He inherited the extensive planning
documents and the legislation creating the system, but it was up to him
and his new board of trustees to make real those plans. Universities and
university systems are difficult to change, even if in theory you are start-
ing afresh and creating a new one. Another state’s regent once said that
changing the course of a university system was as difficult as “turning a
battleship under full steam.” The University of Maine had existed for 104
years before its absorption into the new “University of Maine” (the sys-
tem), and the other small colleges that found themselves also incorpo-
rated had likewise been around for a while and had become used to rela-
tive independence, if also underfunded. Yet the new “super-university”
was supposed to create a master plan, co-ordinate and synchronize their
efforts by “assigning a division of responsibility to all units,” “elimi-
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nat[ing] costly duplication,” accommodating expanding enrollment de-
mand and make a college education available within forty miles of every
Mainer, strengthening graduate studies, promoting economic develop-
ment, and accomplishing a number of other things the planning com-
missions had placed on its do list. McNeil had arrived to find a very full
plate of assignments as well as a horde of barbarians surrounding his
controversial new office.
Among the first items of business had been to figure out what a “su-
per-university” was. It is a term that seldom appears in the higher educa-
tion vocabulary outside of Maine. McNeil had not coined it. It was al-
ready in parlance when he arrived, more so in the news media than in
official documents. Because of the word “super,” one is tempted to be-
lieve it implied that this new “university” would be somehow more won-
derful than your common garden-variety university. However, if one re-
views the contexts in which the term appeared, it seems to imply not
“super-wonderful” but something more like “überuniversity” or “meta-
university”—in other words a superstructure above the actual univer-
sity, or the entity that is a consolidation of a number of universities. The
last two meanings were what actually existed, but the connotation of
“super” raised expectations, perhaps to unrealistic levels, especially given
the chronic and continuing lack of sufficient funding.
Thus, Chancellor McNeil found himself in charge of an entity much
like many others that emerged at the time, as more and more states con-
solidated their colleges and universities into systems, and added more
campuses. Yet he was expected to operate with less adequate funding
than most of those other states, and with the expectation that his cre-
ation would somehow be “super.” The McNeil board and administration
cranked out more paper in response to the state’s expectation that it
would produce a master plan. California had already done so in 1960,
creating a plan that was both masterful and remarkably enduring. Al-
though Maine is not California, we have already noted one feature of the
California master plan that Maine would have done well to adopt. Cali-
fornia had established two-year comprehensive community colleges that
placed affordable higher education within reach of every citizen, and
that met a three-pronged mission at every site: vocational and career
training, liberal-arts preparation for degree completion at four-year col-
leges, and embracing each individual community to meet its needs.
McNeil and his board established some unfortunate precedents that
the state has never been able to overcome. Some of it was not his fault:
the vocational-technical schools eluded incorporation into his system,
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and some of his own two-year schools had already been accorded four-
year status—a status from which it appears no school ever regresses.
However, the McNeil board of trustees immediately burned more
bridges on the road to a statewide system of community colleges. In
1970, the super-university’s board declared that all of its colleges were
now “universities.” They did this even though several of them only had a
few hundred enrolled students and a handful of academic programs.
Just like “super-university,” “university” is a term of indeterminate
meaning. But just like “super-university,” “university” created unrealistic
expectations that could neither be realized nor undone.
Avoiding “costly duplication of services” was another area where the
McNeil administration (like so many others) made little headway. The
terms “costly” or “wasteful duplication” constituted a chimera endlessly
and universally decried by university boards and state legislatures alike.
They certainly sounded like a dragon that needs to be slain, and it is hard
to imagine that unnecessary duplication did not exist among competing
but supposedly allied universities. However, while these imagined costly
and duplicative services must have certainly existed, which services are
they, how does one identify them, and how can they be successfully
eliminated? These questions indeed lead us to the details where you-
know-who dwells.
The issue that never seemed to get sufficient emphasis or considera-
tion in this debate arose from the almost universal fact that a major por-
tion of students enrolled on regional campuses were and are truly place-
bound. They were often working adults who support families with
spouses also tied to their communities. This “new majority” (as Indiana
University President Thomas Ehrlich called them when he championed
the phrase) made up an unexpectedly significant portion of enrollments
in Fort Kent, Presque Isle, Machias, Augusta, Farmington (to a lesser de-
gree) and Portland. The new majority’s existence, and academic needs,
threw a monkey wrench into the planners’ mistaken notion that specific
majors (French and political science, for example) might by exclusively
placed on various campuses, and that students who wished to pursue
those majors could just pack up and move to the campus that met their
need. While there were indeed some major programs that could only be
sustained at a campus as comprehensive as Orono, a need remained for a
basic array of degree programs to exist almost everywhere. This actuality
ultimately trumped theoretical planning concepts.
A thorough anatomy of the pursuit of “costly duplication” is the
subject for another article. As it applies to the McNeil years, his office
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and board certainly struggled with it, but (as is usually the case) with less
success than most would have wished. Certain academic programs on
certain campuses might have been eliminated. Centralized admissions
processing (as practiced by the University of California System) might
have been established. Other back-office services might have been cen-
tralized in Portland or on a single large campus. But for whatever rea-
sons, none of these things happened. And whether it was a good or bad
thing that they did not happen depended upon who you were and how
you were looking at the possibilities.
“Ease of transfer” was another such chimaera. Many states have pur-
sued it; few have fully succeeded in establishing it. Ease of transfer was a
good thing if you are a student seeking to transfer, the parent who was
paying the freight for such a student, a campus looking to make hay by
racking up general education credit hours and then sending students off
for an unavailable major, or a politician thinking simplistically and op-
portunistically. It was a bad thing if you are a professor on the receiving
end of a transfer population that seems ill-prepared, or if you were such
a professor who believed that making transfer of credits difficult resulted
in “higher academic standards.”
Universities operate on the principle that the faculty owns the credit.
Credit and grades awarded by non-faculty entities (read “administrators
and other bureaucrats”) violated that sacred principle in academia. It
was akin to the notion that only physicians should make medical deci-
sions—another politically controversial idea in our society today. What-
ever the ideal solution might be, the public official or university system
administrator who wanted to create a more rational transfer system
must run the gauntlet of academic culture. McNeil’s administration did
not make it through that corridor of challenges, and neither has any suc-
ceeding University of Maine System administration.
The new University of Maine System was not the only such
statewide unit attempting to manage the differentiation of campuses.
This was another common planning item that seems attractive to those
who defined the system in a top-down way. Wisconsin, when it merged
its twenty-six campuses into one university system in 1973, assigned
each unit a “select mission” that was supposed to make it uniquely iden-
tifiable, and to reduce costs by downplaying that special theme on other
campuses. Other states did likewise. Maine never went that far, but the
board did pursue the notion as best they could, at least in planning doc-
uments. Curiously, though, there never appeared to be emphasis or en-
thusiasm at the chancellor or board level for underscoring Orono’s truly
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unique role in the state as the “flagship,” the land-grant, or the Research-
I university. The word “flagship” always seemed to get stuck in the craw
of system officials, who were consciously or unconsciously more com-
fortable with a leveling approach. They tended to give in to the tempta-
tion to say, “If we do something for one campus, we must do it for all the
others.” Witness their 1970 action to declare that all their units were
“universities.” The extension of graduate programs across the system,
and even a few doctoral programs, took place over time with a board
that had difficulty saying “no” to regional and legislative pressures, but
also had a hard time saying “yes” to the notion that true excellence and
economies could be achieved by acknowledging that Orono had unique,
real, and potential strengths in doctoral and research areas that would
have been prohibitively difficult and expensive to duplicate elsewhere.
The result of this leveling instinct was, as Lloyd Elliott predicted, harm-
ful to the growth of the University of Maine at Orono, and expensive for
Maine higher education as a whole.
Another early proposal, centralized admissions, also never hap-
pened. It is a rare phenomenon in higher education. The University of
California has practiced it for a long time. There, a prospective student
lists two or three preferred campuses to the centralized admissions of-
fice, and if admitted at all, the office tells the student where he or she will
be enrolled. This enrollment system has thrived in a university system
that was, and remains, oversubscribed. The nationwide overbuilding of
new campuses in the sixties and seventies created a buyer’s market that
negated the efficacy of centralized admissions for campuses (most state
university campuses and many private colleges and universities fall into
this category) that were competing fiercely with each other and scram-
bling for sufficiently large entering classes.
Finally, how centralized was Chancellor McNeil’s super-university?
The answer may lie in the eye of the beholder. As noted previously, a
common faculty criticism of the newly-formed university system was
that it made them feel “powerless and far removed from the power cen-
ter.” A number of news articles and official reports maintained that, on
the campuses, there was little positive sentiment for the chancellor’s of-
fice and its governance. Structurally, the changes were not as substantial
as one might think. Most significantly, state appropriation now came in
one lump sum to the board, and the chancellor and his staff (with board
approval) decided how it would be allocated to individual campuses.
This process, not surprisingly, has been the battlefield where most intra-
mural blood has been shed, and no allocation system has ever emerged
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that satisfied the campuses as a group. The McNeil administration had
little time to enact a swath of odious policies that would apply to all
campuses. Succeeding administrations and boards have swarmed in var-
ious directions in their attempts to find a working balance between uni-
form top-down policy and campus autonomy. Campuses have main-
tained their own administrations, with presidents, chief academic
officers, chief student affairs officers, chief financial officers, and faculty
senates, etc.
One area where the statistics dramatically suggest a new pattern
brought on by the creation of the system was the average length of pres-
idencies. Between 1865 and 1969, the University of Maine had ten presi-
dents, serving an average term of 10.4 years. Since consolidation, the
university has now been served by another ten presidents. Their average
period of service lasted 4.6 years. Although such correlation does not
necessarily prove causation, it would be foolish to believe that the newly
created dynamic between chancellor and president, where the former
had the power to determine the longevity of the latter, has not made a
difference.
* * *
For the University of Maine and its presidents, the “sixties” effectively
began when Lloyd Elliot replaced Arthur Hauck in 1958, and ended
when Win Libby retired in 1973. Elliott replaced a much-loved legend,
and brought many changes, most of them associated with growth, ex-
pansion, better funding, and higher aspirations for Maine’s leading pub-
lic university. He also began to face challenges virtually unknown to
Hauck and his predecessors: the awakening of student activism; public
eruption over the civil rights struggle; an unpopular and divisive foreign
war; a cultural revolution that changed the way the younger generation
viewed its nature, role, tastes, and liberties; increased public skepticism
about funding higher education; and thoughts of a consolidated “super-
university” for Maine. H. Edwin Young would find himself even more
engaged in most of those challenges and would be the president on
whose watch consolidation occurred. Yet his Maine presidency turned
out to be a mild dress rehearsal for the full-fledged drama that awaited
him in Madison. Winthrop Libby was the president who had to figure
out how to navigate Orono’s brave new world of membership in a con-
solidated system that had not only usurped his campus’s historic name,
but threatened to undercut its traditional roles. He too faced the flood
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tide of student revolt brought on by nationwide changes not of his or
the university’s making. He would emerge with the historic President’s
House still standing and with a shining reputation among students for
bravely and lovingly holding the university together in spite of forces
tearing it apart. Win Libby continued contributing guest columns to the
Ellsworth American while his successors defined the contemporary uni-
versity and its presidency in the context of even more changes and chal-
lenges. He learned, as did his predecessors and successors, that a univer-
sity presidency was like participating in a long-distance relay race. You
grasp the baton, run as fast and as well across an unpredictable land-
scape for as long as you can, and then hand the baton to the next runner. 
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